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We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith.
On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value,
something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be
inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith
is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness,
something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double)
issue on approaches to faith explore questions about faith in a variety of settings
through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to
deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships
(e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business
partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant
goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential
connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance. Discussion of the
specific role that faith plays in religious contexts is also a matter of general social
concern. Interest in religious faith, at least in the English-speaking world, has been
amplified in recent years, not least in response to ongoing acts of religiously
motivated violence such as the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington,
D.C. on September 11, 2001. The question ‘‘Would the world be better off without
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religious faith?’’ is looming larger in public consciousness than ever before. One
line of thought now prevalent in the New Atheist literature maintains that religious
faith provides a social backdrop for extremism. Christopher Hitchens (2007) argues
that it ‘‘poisons everything’’ while Richard Dawkins suggests that it is the ‘‘root of
all evil’’ (2006) and implicates it in ‘‘most, if not all, of the violent enmities in the
world today’’ (Dawkins 2003, 161).
Of course, whether or not faith is of value depends on what it is. According to
Dawkins and other self-identifying ‘‘brights,’’ faith is believing fantastic, but
allegedly divinely revealed, propositions on insufficient evidence. But can it really
be that this is what early religious communities took God or other deities to desire of
humans? Might there be a more satisfying understanding of why Jews, Christians,
and others in the ancient world thought that God would care about faith? What roles
did faith play in their lives and discourse? Are at least some of these roles worth
hanging on to, both in religious and secular life? Perhaps the stark cultural
disagreement over the value of faith and its place in human life is due to faith’s
champions and critics focusing on different phenomena. What if both parties tend to
mischaracterize the nature of faith and, as a result, mischaracterize its value? Might
the clamor around faith in religious contexts lead us to overlook its role in ordinary
secular human relationships? Might attention to faith’s role in ordinary secular
human relationships shed light on how faith should be understood in religious
contexts?
These questions—and many, many others—are at the heart of pistology, the
interdisciplinary study of the nature, value, and rationality of faith, where faith is
thought of as a psychological attitude, state, or trait. Pistology is of considerable
social importance today, not least because how issues about faith get framed and
resolved today will likely affect how generations to come think about those issues.
In response to this perceived social need, the present special volume—Approaches
to Faith—aims to facilitate discussion about what faith is and when it is of
recognizable value and rationality. Whether or not the arguments of contributors to
this volume are successful, together they advance this larger overall aim by better
positioning pistologists to contribute to the conversation from a more philosoph-
ically, historically, and culturally informed perspective.
In what follows, we briefly highlight each contribution. It’s tempting to group
them, although any grouping will be somewhat arbitrary. Even so, perhaps we can
think of the first four contributions as focusing on faith as it is thought of in certain
historical traditions (Greco-Roman culture, the early churches, Rabbinic Judaism,
and Eastern Orthodoxy), the second four contributions as addressing faith as it
appears in secular personal human relationships, and the third four contributions as
addressing specific concerns related to faith in philosophical theology.
Daniel McKaughan kicks things off with a reminder that Greco-Roman culture in
the early Roman principate thought of faith as a good without which no society
could flourish (See Morgan 2015). So understood, faith was the glue that cemented a
wide variety of personal human relationships, as well as relationships between
humans and the gods. So understood, faith was a combination of trust and
commitment, and its value consisted in the stability, security, and resilience that it
provided such relationships. And the same goes for contemporaneous Jewish and
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early Christian understandings of faith, with this difference: the trust and
commitment that bound humans binds humans to God. McKaughan observes that
faith, so understood, was designed, so to speak, to keep people together in marriage,
friendship, business, and so on even when crises of various sorts arose to threaten
the relationship, including fear and doubt. He contends that faith could not play that
role in a relationship, while retaining its value, if belief of the relevant propositions
is required; he uses Saint Teresa of Calcutta as a model to underscore the point.
The view that faith is a kind of belief or that faith requires belief has been and
remains widely held. One motivation for this view is the claim that certain religious
texts demand such an understanding of faith. Daniel Howard-Snyder considers
whether The Gospel of Mark demands such an understanding. Based on a close
reading informed by current scholarship on the Greek notion of pistis (faith) among
both Greco-Roman classicists and among biblical scholars, Howard-Snyder rejects
the claim that Mark’s understanding of faith has it that faith is a kind of belief or
requires belief of the relevant propositions. Instead, he offers an account of Markan
faith according to which what is most central to faith is resilience in the face of
challenges to living in light of the positive overall stance one takes to the object of
faith, and belief of the relevant propositions is optional.
We often hear that humans are to have faith in God. But what about God? Is God
to have faith in humans? That’s a question you don’t hear too often! Rabbi Samuel
Lebens argues that the Hebrew Bible allows for it and that Rabbinic reflection
endorses it. However, some prickly philosophical thorns surround the idea. Rabbi
Lebens attempts to prune them, but what he is chiefly concerned to cultivate is the
idea that just as humans can be people of faith, thereby unifying all manner of things
they regard as important under a grand narrative, a worldview, an ideal, and the like,
so God can be a person of faith unifying all manner of things God regards as
important under the ideal of creation. As such, God is like an artist who expresses
what he values—God puts the brush to the canvas, God breaks through various
internal and external barriers, and God commits to stick with the result. That,
suggests Rabbi Lebens in ‘‘The Life of Faith as a Work of Art,’’ is putting—and
expressing—great faith in creation.
While the Abrahamic faiths underscore the importance of personal faith in God,
there are other ways, argues Terence Cuneo, in which someone might be related to
faith in God without having personal faith in God. In ‘‘Aligning with Lives of
Faith,’’ Cuneo takes his cue from reflection on the role that Eastern Orthodox
liturgies give to the saints, e.g. St. Jacob of Alaska, the patron saint of Cuneo’s own
parish. The liturgical activities that constitute honoring St. Jacob are intended for
parishioners to engage St. Jacob’s life, but such engagement need not be emulating
or identifying with him, or even admiring or appreciating him and his work. Rather,
the engagement that the liturgy calls for is aligning oneself with—or, being aligned
with—the life of St. Jacob. To be so aligned consists in investing oneself in the
history of St. Jacob’s life of faith and allowing his life to shape one’s sensibilities,
thinking and loyalties, through liturgical acts, and allowing or authorizing St. Jacob
to fully represent one. Interestingly, one can align oneself with a saint’s faith in God
even if one does not have personal faith in God. The upshot is that it matters who or
what one aligns oneself with, and not just having personal faith in God.
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It is a deaf ear that cannot hear the role of faith in personal human relationships.
One of the things that we care about in our most cherished relationships is the
support we receive—and give—to our friends, spouses, lovers, etc. In ‘‘Supporting
Intimates on Faith,’’ George Tsai identifies a demanding virtue of being supportive
of one’s intimates, explains what it is, and argues that one cannot have it unless one
has faith in the self-expressive pursuits of one’s intimates. Among other things, Tsai
describes how such intimate-supportive faith enables one’s intimates to more
meaningfully explore and express themselves, and how it also deepens the
emotional bonds of the relationship.
Lara Buchak, in ‘‘Faith and Steadfastness in the Face of Counterevidence,’’
extends her prior work in pistology to demonstrate how faith provides for a certain
sort of personal integrity over time that would otherwise be elusive. On Buchak’s
view, faith requires that one commits to risky acts before examining further
evidence. But faith also requires recalcitrance in the face of new evidence that goes
against what one has put one’s faith in. As such, faith seems neither rational nor
admirable. By distinguishing synchronic and diachronic aspects of faith, and by
appealing to a variety of theses in formal epistemology—having to do with
credences, utilities, and risk-attitudes—Buchak explains how it is that, although at a
particular time, one’s total evidence might make it seem irrational for one to have
faith that something is the case and to act on it, one’s total evidence might yet make
it rational for one to retain faith and continue to act over the long term. Faith thus
makes it possible for us to keep our commitments, especially to enduring projects,
despite counterevidence, and provides integrity in our lives.
One can have a lot of faith or trust in a person or just a little. Faith in a person is
the sort of thing that can grow, deepen, and develop over time or waver, diminish,
regress, fail, or be broken or abandoned. But how should we characterize the idea
that faith admits of degree, given that some minimal conditions are satisfied in order
to qualify as having faith at all? In ‘‘The Strength of Faith and Trust,’’ Michael Pace
argues that faith can be psychologically strong or weak in two distinct senses. Other
things being equal, if my degree of confidence as measured by my willingness to
take risks on a person’s doing such and such increases, my faith in that person to do
such and such increases. Similarly, other things being equal, the more resistant I am
to revising my confidence in the face of counterevidence, the stronger my faith.
It is becoming increasingly common for philosophers to use fiction as a medium
for exploring philosophical questions. In her contribution to the volume, Frances
Howard-Snyder uses fiction to explore the nature and value of faith. ‘‘The Pearl of
Great Price’’ problematizes the idea that faith is unqualifiedly good or valuable. The
main character, Janet, is a well-intentioned single mom and breakfast diner waitress
whose noble desire to provide a better life for her daughter leads her to get caught
up in a pyramid sales scheme. Discerning readers will discover layers of insight and
complexity in this short and carefully crafted piece. But one point not to be lost is
that Janet displays many of the features of faith under discussion in the current
literature—including belief of or trust in salient propositions, committing to live in
light of something one sees as valuable, and tenaciously sticking with that
commitment through difficulties—and yet vividly illustrates, in a variety of ways,
how it is bad to have such faith.
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While some Christians think Jesus lacked any sort of faith at all, others, like Beth
Rath, think that Jesus had faith that, among other things, God loved him. Now, on
the cross, Jesus reportedly cried, ‘‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?,’’
thereby making manifest the fact that Jesus no longer enjoyed closeness with God,
so much so that Jesus was in doubt about whether God loved him. Thus, Jesus lost
his faith that God loved him. But Jesus’ behavior and attitudes immediately prior to
and after the cry indicate that he retained faith that God loved him; moreover, it’s
difficult to see how Jesus could model faith in the darkest times if he lost his faith
that God loved him while he was on the cross. Thus, Jesus did not lose his faith that
God loved him. We have a contradiction. In ‘‘Christ’s Faith, Doubt, and the Cry of
Dereliction,’’ Rath draws on Facundo Alonso’s work on propositional reliance to
interrogate the hidden premise in the puzzle of the cry of dereliction: that Jesus’
faith that God loved him was incompatible with his being in doubt about the matter.
In ‘‘Jesus as an Exemplar of Faith in the New Testament,’’ Dale Tuggy carefully
presents five independent lines of evidence for thinking that, in the New Testament,
Jesus was not only a man of faith in God, but a paragon of faith in God, someone
worthy of our imitation. But here a surprising result arguably emerges. After all, as
Aquinas argued, no fully divine being could have faith in God. For a fully divine
being would be omniscient, and omniscience is incompatible with faith. It follows
that Jesus was not fully divine, which hardly sits well with the dominant
Chalcedonian Christian tradition. Tuggy considers several responses to this
argument and finds each of them wanting, recommending in the end that a return
to the NT text might well be a long overdue corrective to the excesses of Chalcedon,
not to mention Nicea, Constantinople, and beyond.
Anne Jeffery observes that the question of the epistemic rationality of theistic
faith has swamped the literature in the last fifty years. However, as Jeffery points out
in ‘‘Does hope morally vindicate faith?’’ even if such faith is epistemically rational,
it might nevertheless be morally and pragmatically irrational, and so fully deserving
of our rejection. Jeffery finds four arguments for the moral and pragmatic
irrationality of faith and argues that unless faith is coupled with hope these four
arguments constitute powerful reason to reject faith. The upshot is that faith doesn’t
have a prayer without hope.
It is customary to distinguish epistemic and pragmatic rationality, and the
considerations that are relevant to each. Evidence is relevant to the former;
existential fulfillment is relevant to the latter. Thus, in comparing two worldviews,
or two religions, the evidence is relevant to the epistemic rationality of putting your
faith in one over the other, and existential fulfillment is relevant to the pragmatic
rationality of putting your faith in one over the other. Or so we might have thought.
Brian Ballard, in ‘‘The Rationality of Faith and the Benefits of Religion,’’ argues
that the existential resources of a worldview or religion—its resources for dealing
with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and
personal growth—is not only relevant to the pragmatic rationality of faith in it, but
also the epistemic rationality of one’s faith in it. If this is right, then philosophers
have much too easily dismissed the existential resources of a worldview or religion
in their assessment of the epistemic rationality of faith in it. New territory of
assessment is ripe for the exploring.
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While no collection of fresh essays in pistology can do justice to this exciting,
new field of inquiry, we hope that the essays contained in this volume will at least
contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature, value, and rationality of faith,
and pistology’s relevance to traditional areas such as philosophy of religion and
philosophical theology.
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